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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Petitioner appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post
conviction relief where the court did not appoint counsel.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The court succinctly described the underlying criminal case and post
conviction procedure in its Notice of Intent to Dismiss (hereinafter Notice of
Intent):
On July 12, 2008, the jury returned a verdict against Ramiro
Ramirez and his codefendant Garrett Digiallonardo on the charge
of Burglary, a felony. The same jury found the codefendants not
guilty of the charges of aiding/abetting aggravated assault and
aiding/abetting attempted robbery. The Judgment of Conviction on
the charge of burglary as to Ramirez was entered on September 8,
2008. The petitioner filed a timely appeal from the Judgment of
Conviction. The issue raised in the appeal by trial counsel was the
trial court's denial of the petitioner's motion for mistrial. The State
Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) was appointed to represent the
petitioner on his appeal. The SAPD filed an Amended Notice of
Appeal. The SAPD also raised on appeal whether the sentence
imposed was excessive in addition to the denial of the mistrial.
On April 21, 2011 the Court of Appeals issued its unpublished
opinion affirming the judgment of conviction. State v. Ramirez, 2011
Unpublished Opinion No. 447. The Court of Appeals summarized
the facts of the case as follows:
At approximately 10:30 p.m. on March 4, 2008, an assistant
manager at Domino's Pizza in Jerome, Carol Jones, and the
lone other employee, Jamie Ceja, went behind the building
for a cigarette break while in the process of closing the
restaurant for the evening. Jones sat in the driver's seat of
her vehicle, parked just outside the back door, and Ceja sat
in the backseat. The back door of the restaurant was open
and Jones had her windows down.
After a short time, the women heard a car approach, two
doors slam, and two men approach the restaurant. The men
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stopped to pull masks or bandanas over their faces before
entering the back door. Jones testified that one of the men
was wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt and was carrying a
gun and the other was wearing dark clothing. She rolled up
her car windows and instructed Ceja to call 911. Jones
watched as the men entered the restaurant.
The man in the gray sweatshirt went directly to the office.
The other man went out of sight, but then ran out the back
door toward the vehicle in which he came, without looking at
the women. She then stated that the man with the weapon
exited the building, stopped at the vehicle and she asked
him, 'What do you want?" He reached for the door handle,
and Jones told him it was locked. The man said something
to her, which she could not decipher because it was muffled,
and then pointed the rifle at her face. Jones started her
vehicle and began backing it up. The man ran toward his
vehicle and the perpetrators left, with the women following
them for a short distance and Ceja describing the incident to
dispatch. The women returned to the store where they
discovered that the men had not taken anything, including
any of the approximately $1,700 cash that was accessible or
in plain sight at the time: Both employees told police the
perpetrators were Hispanic, driving a silver Honda, one had
a shotgun, and both had either bandanas or gorilla masks
over their faces.
At approximately 10:47 p.m., an officer stopped a silver twodoor Honda Civic traveling out of Jerome County into Twin
Falls County. [Garrett] Digiallonardo was the driver and
Ramiro Ramirez was in the passenger seat. After two
officers arrived to assist, Digiallonardo and Ramirez were
pulled from their vehicle at gunpoint, handcuffed, and placed
in patrol cars. Subsequently, the Domino's employees were
instructed to drive to the scene, where they viewed the
men's vehicle and affirmed that while they had not seen their
faces, Digiallonardo and Ramirez were similar in height and
build to the men they had seen at Domino's. Jones also
identified a gray hooded sweatshirt found in the vehicle as
the same as that worn by one of the perpetrators.
On April 3, 2012 the petitioner filed a timely petition for postconviction relief together with a motion for appointment of counsel.
The petitioner alleges in his petition that the SAPD was ineffective
in his representation on appeal in failing to contest the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the conviction on the charge of burglary.
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Notice of Intent, p. 1-3. (R. 83-85.)
In addition to providing its notice of intent to dismiss, the notice also
denied Petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel:
Based on the procedural and factual background as set forth herein
and based on the fact that the petitioner has not made a prima facie
showing in support of his petition that appellate counsel was
ineffective, it would appear that the Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief is frivolous; therefore, the Motion for Appointment of Counsel
is DENIED without prejudice to the petitioner renewing his motion
for appointment of counsel as part of any response to this Notice of
Intent to Dismiss.
Notice of Intent, p. 7. (R. p. 89.)
Petitioner filed a reply to the Notice of Intent, but the court ultimately
dismissed the petition. (R. p. 105-112; 117-128.)
entered. (R. p. 131.)
Petitioner timely appeals. (R. p. 133.)
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A separate judgment was

ISSUE

Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing the petition for post
conviction relief and/or whether it erred by dismissing it without appointing
counsel.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred by Summarily Dismissing the Petition for Post Conviction
Relief and/or It Erred by Dismissing It Without Appointing Counsel

A.

Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal
An application for post-conviction relief under Idaho Code § 19-4901 is

civil in nature and is an entirely new proceeding distinct from the criminal action
which led to the conviction. Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494 (Ct.App. 1994).

In

order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the applicant must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which the request for postconviction relief is based. Id.
Summary disposition is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment
under I.R.C.P. 56, with the facts construed and all reasonable inferences made in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho
759 (Ct.App. 1991 ).

Allegations contained in the verified petition are deemed

true for the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary hearing should be
held. Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844 (Ct.App. 1994).

If the allegations do not

frame a genuine issue of material fact, the court may grant a motion to summarily
dismiss, but if the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must
conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id.
In determining whether a motion for summary disposition was properly
granted, the appellate court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to
petitioner and determines whether, if true, they would entitle petitioner to relief.
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319 (1995).
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B.

Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel
The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is

well established, being set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984).

The "benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be

whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result." Id. at 686.
Strickland set forth a two-prong test which a defendant must satisfy in
order to be entitled to relief.

The defendant must demonstrate both that his

counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of
the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 687-88; State v. Charboneau,
116 Idaho 129 (1989); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986).

C.

Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of
Appellate Counsel
The standards regarding ineffective assistance of appellate counsel were

detailed in Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 168 P.3d 40 (Ct.App. 2007):
Mintun's claims that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel because appointed counsel should have raised certain
additional issues on appeal are subject to the standards set forth in
Strickland, and Mintun therefore must show that appellate counsel's
performance was deficient and caused prejudice in the outcome of
the appeal. An indigent defendant does not have a constitutional
right to compel appointed appellate counsel to press all
nonfrivolous arguments that the defendant wishes to pursue.
Rather, the process of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal
and focusing on those more likely to prevail, far from being the
6

evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate
advocacy. "Notwithstanding Barnes, it is still possible to bring a
Strickland claim based on counsel's failure to raise a particular
claim, but it is difficult to demonstrate that counsel was
incompetent." "[O]nly when ignored issues are clearly stronger than
those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of
counsel be overcome."
Id., 168 P.3d at p. 45 (internal citations omitted).
D.

Standards for Appointing Counsel
The standards for appointing counsel in a post conviction action were

detailed in Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 102 P.3d 1108 (2004):
A request for appointment of counsel in a post conviction
proceeding is governed by Idaho Code § 19-4904, which provides
that in proceedings under the UPCPA, a court-appointed attorney
"may be made available" to an applicant who is unable to pay the
costs of representation.
The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel
lies within the discretion of the district court. The Court of Appeals
has ruled that when a district court is "... presented with a request
for appointed counsel, the court must address this request before
ruling on the substantive issues in the case." This Court observed
in Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 23 P.3d 138 (2001) that
As stated above, a needy applicant for post-conviction relief
is entitled to court-appointed counsel unless the trial court
determines that the post-conviction proceeding is frivolous.
Idaho Code § 19-852(b)(3) sets forth the standard for
determining whether or not a post-conviction proceeding is
frivolous. It is frivolous if it is "not a proceeding that a
reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to
bring at his own expense." When applying that standard to
pro se applications for appointment of counsel, the trial court
should keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed by a
pro se petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete.
Although facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged
because they do not exist, they also may not be alleged
because the pro se petitioner simply does not know what are
the essential elements of a claim.
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It is essential that the petitioner be given adequate notice of
the claimed defects so he has an opportunity to respond and
to give the trial court an adequate basis for deciding the
need for counsel based upon the merits of the claims. If the
court decides that the claims in the petition are frivolous, the
court should provide sufficient information regarding the
basis for its ruling to enable the petitioner to supplement the
request with the necessary additional facts, if they exist.
Although the petitioner is not entitled to have counsel
appointed in order to search the record for possible
nonfrivolous claims, he should be provided with a meaningful
opportunity to supplement the record and to renew his
request for court-appointed counsel prior to the dismissal of
his petition where, as here, he has alleged facts supporting
some elements of a valid claim.
135 Idaho at 679, 23 P.3d at 141.
Here, the district judge should have first determined whether
Charboneau was entitled to court-appointed counsel before
denying the post-conviction relief on its merits. Based upon our
decision in Quinlan v. Idaho Comm'n for Pardons and Parole, 138
Idaho 726, 69 P.3d 146 (2003), it is clear that the standards
imposed by I.C. § 19-852 are no longer applicable to the court's
determination of entitlement to counsel in a post conviction
proceeding. For the purposes of I.C. 19-4904, the trial court should
determine if the petitioner is able to afford counsel and whether this
is a situation in which counsel should be appointed to assist the
petitioner. In doing that analysis, the trial court should keep in mind
the admonition set forth in Brown about the typical problems with
pro se pleadings. Therefore, in giving notice of intent to deny the
Petition, "the court should provide sufficient information regarding
the basis for its ruling to enable the petitioner to supplement the
request with the necessary additional facts, if they exist." Id. If he
alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court
should appoint counsel in order to give the petitioner an opportunity
with counsel to properly allege the necessary supporting facts.
Id., p. 792-793 (internal citations and footnote omitted).

E.

The Claims and the Court's Rulings
The claims were explained by the district court in its Notice of Intent as

follows:
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The petitioner claims that appellate counsel was ineffective in his
representation on appeal in failing to raise on appeal (1) that the
evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt; (2) that the trial court erred in failing to grant to
[sic] defendant's motion for acquittal at the close of the State's
case; (3) that the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion to
suppress the out-of court identifications; and (4) that the trial court
erred in granting the State's Motion to consolidate the trial of Mr.
Ramirez and Mr. Digiallonardo. The petitioner does not allege that
his trial counsel was ineffective in or prior to the trial or as to the
issues raised in the Notice of Appeal.
Notice of Intent, p. 8. (R. p. 90.)
While Appellant asserts that the court should not have dismissed any
claim without first appointing counsel, he directly challenges only the dismissal of
the claim regarding the motion to suppress. As to it, the post conviction court
explained:
On May 23, 2008 petitioner's trial counsel filed a motion and
memorandum in support of to [sic] suppress the alleged out-of court
identification of the defendants by the victims. This motion was
heard and argued on June 9, 2008. The decision of this motion was
also a subject of the court's Memorandum Decision entered on
June 12, 2008. (Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Plaintiff's
Motions to Consolidate and Defendants' Motions to Suppress,
entered June 12, 2008, pg. 10-11; 12-13). The transcript of this
proceeding and the court's written decision were part of the record
on appeal.
This court in denying the motion to suppress identified the standard
that applied as follows:
In suppression hearings, "the power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court." State v. Conant, 143
Idaho 797, 153 P.3d 477 (2007).
The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process ensures a
criminal defendant's right to be free of impermissibly suggestive
out-of-court identifications.
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The defendant's right to due process is implicated when an
in-court identification is tainted by an out-of-court
identification that is so suggestive that there is a very
substantial likelihood of misidentification. See State v. Bush,
131 Idaho 22, 28, 951 P.2d 1249, 1255 (1997). So long as
the identification possesses sufficient aspects of reliability,
there is not a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Id. To
determine the reliability of a suggestive identification, we
evaluate the totality of the circumstances through
consideration of five factors: (1) the opportunity of the
witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the
witness's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of his or her
prior description of the criminal (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated at the identification; and (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification.
State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 321, 127 P.2d 212,224 (Ct. App.
2005).

In applying the above stated standard this court stated in denying
the motion to suppress,
The defendants assert in substantially similar memorandums
in support of their motions to suppress that an out-of-court
identification of the suspects by the two witnesses was
impermissibly suggestive and unreliable. For that reason, the
defendants argue, the initial identifications should be
suppressed as well as any in-court identifications. The State
argues that the "identification" by Ms. Jones and Ms. Ceja
was not an out-of-court identification for Due Process
concerns but was rather a portion of the information
gathering for the officers' investigation into probable cause.
The facts of these two cases are strikingly similar to the facts
in State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 964 P.2d 660 (1998), except
both Ms. Jones and Ms. Ceja admit that they never saw the
faces of the two defendant's at the scene of the crime. In
Buti the court upheld the admissibility of the identification of
the defendant. In the present case both of the witnesses
were positive that the vehicle that left the scene at Domino's
was a silver 2-door silver Honda. They positively identified
the defendant's vehicle at the scene of the stop in Twin Falls.
The defendant's are not seeking to suppress the
identification of the silver 2-door Honda.
The preliminary hearing transcript shows that the two
witnesses, Ms. Jones and Ms. Ceja, did not make any in10

court identifications of the defendants as being the
perpetrators of the crime at Domino's. Similarly, the
testimony at the preliminary hearing also makes perfectly
clear that at no time during the situation at Domino's did
either Ms. Jones or Ms. Ceja observe the faces of either of
the two suspects. The record has established that the
witnesses informed the police that they observed the basic
height, build, and clothing worn by the suspects during the
incident at Domino's. Sergeant Baker asked Ms. Ceja and
Ms. Jones to come to Twin Falls to see if the car, the
clothing, and the individuals detained in Twin Falls matched
the general physical description of the individuals seen in
Jerome at Domino's. A reasonable inference to be drawn
from Sergeant Baker's testimony is that the police knew that
a true identification of either defendant as a perpetrator have
been impossible, because the witnesses both acknowledged
that they had never seen either suspect's face. Indeed,
neither witness ever told the police "this is the person I saw
at Domino's": rather, the witnesses noted similar
characteristics between the suspects at Domino's and the
defendants. The information relayed from the witnesses to
the officers in Twin Falls was combined with other
circumstantial evidence to form probable cause for arrest
warrants seeking to arrest the defendants for the underlying
robbery attempt. The "identification" by the witnesses was an
acknowledgment of factual similarities, but it was not a
positive out-of-court identification that either of the men
shown outside police cars in Twin Falls participated in the
activity at Domino's. The in-court identification of the
defendants was an affirmation by the witnesses that the
defendants were the same individuals they were shown in
Twin Falls; it was not an affirmation that the defendants were
the individuals seen in Jerome at Domino's. Because the
witnesses' statements to the officers in Twin Falls
acknowledging similarities between the individuals they
observed at the time of the crime and the individuals they
were shown in Twin Falls did not constitute an out-of-court
identification, the defendants' due process rights are not
implicated. As such, the defendants' motions to suppress
shall be denied.
The issues to be raised on appeal by appellate counsel are tactical
or strategic decisions which are not to be second-guessed on postconviction unless those decisions are based on inadequate
preparation, ignorance of relevant law or other shortcomings
capable of objective evaluation. Id. The petitioner has failed to
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present a triable issue of fact or a prima facie case that appellate
counsel was either deficient or that he was prejudice in failing to
raise on appeal the denial of the motion to suppress since there
has been no showing by the petitioner that the trial court erred in its
decision to deny the motion or that he would have prevailed on
appeal if the issue had been raised.
Notice of Intent, p. 12-13 (underlined emphasis added). (R. p. 94-95.)
As mentioned above, the Petitioner did file a pro se reply to the Notice of
Intent, which was summarized by the court as follows in its final Order dismissing
Petition for post conviction relief (hereinafter Order):
The petitioner in his Reply to the Notice of Intent to Dismiss,
asserts that law enforcement made a "rush to judgment"; that the
victims "were not very sure of the descriptions of the two individuals
who went into the store"; that the testimony of the victims became
more specific after the defendants were taken into custody; that law
enforcement did not investigate other possibilities; that there were
no masks or guns recovered; and that there was no direct evidence
linking the defendants to the crime.
Order, p. 6-7. (R. p. 122-123.)
In its final order, the court stood by its original rulings in its Notice of Intent.
As to the failure to appeal the denial of the suppression motion, the court stated
in full:
There is no dispute that prior to trial petitioner's trial counsel sought
to suppress what they characterized by counsel as the victims' "out
of court identification of the defendants". The victims never made
what is commonly understood to be an "identification" of the
defendant's. The victims only testified as to characteristics or
similarities of the defendants as to their clothing, height, build, and
skin color as well as the description of the car being driven by the
suspects. The facts were similar to the facts in State v. Buti, 131
Idaho 793, 964 P.2d 660 (1998).
The testimony was clear that the victims could not identify the
defendants by their faces. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate
a prima facie claim that appellate counsel's failure to raise this
issue on appeal was the result of "inadequate preparation,
12

ignorance of relevant law or other shortcomings capable of
objective evaluation." Baxter v. State, supra. There is no showing
that appellate counsel could have made a valid argument that the
trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress or that the
petitioner would have prevailed on appeal. Therefore, this claim
should be dismissed.
Order, p. 9. (R. p. 125.)

F.

The Court Erred in Summarily Denying the Petition and Without
Appointing Counsel
Petitioner asserts that the district court erred in summarily denying the

petition for post conviction relief and/or in summarily denying it without first
appointing counsel. This is because the court denied the post conviction claim
(and counsel) by just carrying on its flawed conclusion from its memorandum
decision in the criminal case denying the motion to suppress. Since the court
was wrong in denying the motion to suppress, it was likewise wrong in denying
the claim that appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to appeal that
erroneous decision.
In its Notice of Intent, the post conviction court provides in full its analysis
from its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Plaintiff's Motions to Consolidate
and

Defendants'

Motions

to

Suppress

(hereinafter

Decision

Denying

Suppression). It repeatedly states that there was no identification, but rather the
witnesses merely acknowledged similar characteristics shared by the two men in
the show up and the two men at the Domino's store.

This is not correct,

however, and does not even follow the court's own recitation of the evidence of
those witnesses from the preliminary hearing which the court sets forth in the
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same Decision Denying Suppression. 1
As to the first witness, Carol Jones, the court's Decision Denying
Suppression sets forth the relevant part of her preliminary hearing testimony as
follows:
Upon arriving at the scene in Twin Falls, Ms. Jones immediately
recognized the silver Honda as the same car from the crime. Ms.
Jones testified that she recognized the two men by their size and
shaved heads. The police took one man out of a car, and Ms.
Jones recognized him as similar but thought the man had a darker
skin tone. Ms. Jones testified that the second man the officers
showed her after taking him out of a different car was wearing
different clothes from those that were worn during the crime. She
testified that it was mainly the shaved head and the temple part of
the skin that made her believe it was one of the men from earlier.
When an officer brought a gray baggy sweatshirt out of the silver
Honda stopped in Twin Falls, Ms. Jones testified that she believed
it was the same gray sweatshirt worn by the second man to enter
the business during the crime-that is, the man that pointed what
she thought was a rifle at her. During Ms. Jones' testimony the
defendant Digiallonardo was identified as the first person to be
shown to Ms. Jones in Twin Falls. The defendant Ramirez was
identified during Ms. Jones' testimony as the second man who was
shown to Ms. Jones for identification in Twin Falls.
Decision Denying Suppression, p. 5. (R. 35761, p. 54.)
As to the second witness, Jamie Ceja, the court described her testimony
as follows:
The second man the police showed Ms. Ceja and Ms. Jones was
wearing, according to Ms. Ceja, a tank top and baggy pants. Ms.
Ceja testified that the second man taken out of a car in Twin Falls
"was wearing a tank top, and he looked - yeah, he looked like it
also, the height and everything. And then at the car they took the
gray hoodie out and that just really - it - I believe that that was that was him." Ms. Ceja identified defendant Ramirez as the second
man shown to Ms. Ceja in Twin Falls. Ms. Ceja testified that she
only saw the clothes and the height of the criminals and based her

The post conviction court took judicial notice of this decision and Appellant is
requesting this Court do so also in a contemporaneously filed motion.
1
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identification off of that, because she didn't see faces in Jerome,
just the clothes and the heights of the men.
Decision Denying Suppression, p. 6 (emphasis added). (R. 35761, p. 55.)
The court later described the police officer's testimony at the suppression
hearing who testified regarding the show up procedure. He testified that the
witnesses were brought to the suspects' vehicle which was shown in lights, and
the witnesses then looked at the suspects who were handcuffed and placed in
spot lights, and the witnesses were together when they made their identifications.
(R. 35761, p. 58.)
Clearly, the court is just wrong when it claims that the witnesses are not
identifying the two men in the show up as the two men who committed the crime.
It appears that the court is laboring under a misconception that an identification
must include facial recognition. Obviously, facial recognition is not necessary in
all cases, the most obviously one being a tattoo identification.

Here, where

witness(es) say that it is the same car, that they are the same clothes, that the
men are the same height, and that they have the same shaved head, that is an
identification. The lack of facial recognition merely goes to· its weight and does
not mean it was not an identification in the first place.
The same is true as to the witnesses' use of the word "believe." Assuming
arguendo that it is actually a qualifier, it also just goes to weight and the degree
of certainty of the identification, there is no requirement that an identification be
100% certain in order to be an identification.
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Back to the testimony, even ignoring Carol Jones' identification as the
weaker of the two, Jamie Ceja's identification expressly said "that was him." That
is an identification, and the court was wrong when it held it was not.
Since the court was wrong about whether it was an identification, it was
also wrong when it failed to analyze it as such. Without belaboring it since no
analysis was done, the court describes multiple self evident problems in the show
up that establishes it was overly suggestive, including the fact that it was not a
lineup, the suspects were in handcuffs and spot lighted, and the witnesses were
together when making their identifications.

Since the show up was overly

suggestive, the court should have gone on to analyze the likelihood of
misidentification, which based on the factors the court itself set forth, is high.
The criminal court's error in mischaracterizing what happened as not an
identification

and

the

court's

resultant

failure

to

analyze

the

suggestiveness/misidentification issue provided a valid appellate issue for direct
appeal. Of course, appointed appellate counsel failed to raise this issue. Given
all this, Appellant asserts that the court erred in summarily dismissing this claim
without an evidentiary hearing.
Alternatively, the court should have appointed counsel. As shown above,
the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise the suppression
issue is not nearly as clear cut as the post conviction court believes. Counsel
should have been appointed to assist the Petitioner in developing this claim (and
perhaps others) and the court erred when it failed to appoint counsel.
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CONCLUSION
Wherefore,

for the

reasons

as stated

above,

Appellant/Petitioner

respectfully requests that the district court's order summarily dismissing his
petition for post conviction relief be reversed and vacated and that the petition for
post conviction relief be remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing
and/or that counsel be a~inted.
DATED this

[.0:_ day of November, 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF SE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this / Cf day of November, 2013, I served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing APflEi.LANT'S BRIEF, by the method as
indicated below:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATEHOUSE, ROOM 210
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0010

17

W,.S. Mail, postage preP, ·a
·~and Delivered to th Attorney
General's mailb
t the
Supreme Co
A~

,/

